COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: PANEL DATA EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE by Kappeler, Andreas & Valila, Timo
 
 
Economic and Financial Report 2007/02 
 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: 
PANEL DATA EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 
 
Andreas Kappeler and Timo Välilä* 
† 
 
Disclaimer: This Economic and Financial Report should not be reported as 
representing the views of the EIB. The views expressed in this EFR are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the EIB or EIB policy. EFRs 
describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments 
and further debate. 
 
JEL Classification codes: H54, H77, H72, C23, C24 
 
 
* Andreas Kappeler is a PhD student at Munich Graduate School of Economics/LMU. He visited the 
Economic and Financial Studies Division of the European Investment Bank during this research.  
 Timo Välilä is Senior Economist, Economic and Financial Studies Division of the European Investment 
Bank. 
† The authors would like to thank Eric Perée and the participants of the Public Economics Seminar at the 
University of Munich (LMU), Department of Economics, for comments on an earlier draft.   
 
 
   
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: 





We present some stylised facts about the composition of public investment in Europe and 
analyse its determinants, with a special focus on the role of fiscal decentralisation. The 
empirical analysis is conducted both for levels of different types of public investment and 
for their shares in total public investment. The results suggest that fiscal decentralisation 
boosts economically productive public investment, notably infrastructure, and curbs the 
relative share of economically less productive public investment, such as recreational 
facilities. While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, 
especially as regards the provision of local public goods, these findings can be interpreted 
in terms of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the quality 
of public expenditure weighing in firms’ location decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Public investment has received only limited academic attention as an aggregate variable, 
and its composition has to our knowledge received none at all, at least in the European 
context. This paper seeks to fill that gap at least in part by presenting some stylised facts 
about the composition of public investment in Europe and by presenting an empirical 
analysis of what drives different types of public investment, with a special focus on the 
impact of fiscal federalism. 
 
Perhaps because of lack of academic attention, misconceptions abound concerning the 
nature, drivers, and impact of public investment. Most notably, there is often confusion 
about what it is in the first place. Perhaps the most prominent example of this type of 
confusion is the customary synonymous use of “public investment” and “infrastructure 
investment” in much of economic literature. There is, however, a great deal of 
infrastructure investment that is not public, and there is a great deal of public investment 
that is not infrastructure investment. While it is well-known that many roads, water and 
sanitation networks, and municipal swimming pools are publicly funded and provided, 
neither economic theory nor empirical analyses have really distinguished between them 
when studying what determines “public investment” or how productive “public 
investment” is.  
 
As a starting point for a more nuanced analysis and understanding of public investment, 
we first break it down into different types with distinctly different economic 
characteristics in section 2. We then propose to use the traditional theory of fiscal 
federalism and some of its more recent extensions, reviewed in section 3, to derive 
hypotheses about the link between fiscal decentralisation and the composition of public 
investment. Section 4 seeks to articulate empirical tests of the hypotheses, and their 
results are interpreted from an economic perspective in section 5, before concluding in 
section 6. 
 
  32.   Composition of Public Investment in Europe: Stylised Facts 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analyses have been conducted with a focus on 
the composition of public investment, at least in the European context. Therefore, we 
start off by describing the available data in this section. Special attention is paid to the 
link between the composition of public investment and fiscal federalism, which is the 
focus of our subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
Based on the functional classification of government expenditure in the 1993 UN System 
of National Accounts and in the 1995 European System of Accounts (ESA 95), Eurostat 
provides a breakdown of public investment for EU countries starting in the early 1990s. 
Complete data are available for EU15 countries from 1995 (i.e, the introduction of ESA 
95) through 2005.
1 However, many countries have back-dated their time series to 1990. 
 
The “public investment” variable is gross capital formation of the general government. 
This includes changes in inventories, which may create some undesired noise for our 
analysis; however, the breakdown between gross fixed capital formation and changes in 
inventories is not available.  
 
The functional breakdown of public investment is presented in Table 1. The right-hand 
side column shows the functional classification (Classification of Functions of 
Government, COFOG for short) in ESA 95. The left-hand side shows our aggregation of 
the 10 available “functions” into four types of public investment with economically 
distinct roles. This aggregation will be used in the remainder of this paper.  
 
The four different types of public investment affect the economy through different 
channels, with varying degrees of directness, and over different time horizons. Public 
                                                 
1 EU15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We exclude Luxemburg 
from the sample because of its small size and special macroeconomic and structural characteristics.  
  4investment in Infrastructure, consisting of just Economic Affairs in the ESA 95 COFOG,
2 
seeks to measure public investment in traditional infrastructure, mainly transport. This 
type of public investment has the most direct economic impact by reducing firms’ 
production and transaction costs. The economic impact of public investment in Hospitals 
and Schools is more long-term and less direct in character, as it facilitates the building up 
and maintenance of the economy’s stock of human capital. Investment in Public Goods 
affects the economy’s allocative efficiency indirectly through framework conditions for 
productive activity. Finally, Redistribution affects the economy’s income distribution 
rather than allocative or productive efficiency per se.  
 
Table 1: Functional breakdown of public investment 
Aggregation ESA  95  COFOG 
1. Infrastructure (INF)  Economic Affairs 
2. Hospitals and Schools (HS)   Health 
Education 
3. Public Goods (PG)  Defence 
General Public Services 
Environment 
Order and Safety 
4. Redistribution (RED)  Housing 
Recreation 
Social Protection 
Source: Eurostat; own aggregation. 
 
In addition to the composition of Infrastructure investment (see footnote 2), some other 
aggregates shown in Table 1 contain undesirable “noise” as no further breakdowns of the 
right-hand side “functions” are available. For example, public investment in water supply 
and wastewater management are not part of Infrastructure as one would wish; instead, 
they are part of Redistribution (Housing) and Public Goods (Environment), respectively. 
Similarly, one would wish to include street lightning in Public Goods; now it is in 
Housing and thereby Redistribution. However, as with Infrastructure, we expect such 
                                                 
2 Economic Affairs comprise a number of different sectors, including agriculture; fuel and energy; mining, 
manufacturing and construction; transport; communication; R&D; and others. Among these sectors, 
transport is likely to be by far the dominant recipient of public investment. Note that investment by energy 
companies owned by the public sector, for example, is classified as private investment in national accounts 
statistics as long as such companies are commercially run.  
  5“noise” to be of sufficiently small magnitude so as not to invalidate the empirical analysis 
below. 
 
Turning to the data, Figure 1 depicts the composition of public investment in EU14 
(EU15 less Luxembourg) as per the aggregation presented above. There are some striking 
differences between countries; for example, the level of investment in Infrastructure in 
the Netherlands and Ireland is as much as four times that in the UK or Denmark (top 
panel). Public investment in Hospitals and Schools in Greece is some four times the level 
in Austria and Belgium. Sweden and Italy have almost three times the level of public 
investment in Public Goods compared to Austria, Denmark, and Germany. Finally, public 
investment in Redistribution in France is almost five times that in Austria and the UK.  
 
Figure 1. Composition of public investment in EU14  
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Source:  Eurostat, own calculations. 
Note:  Data on Public Goods not available for Ireland. 
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In terms of shares of total public investment (bottom panel in Figure 1), we note that 
traditional Infrastructure accounts on average for about one-third and Hospital and 
Schools—which are sometimes denoted human capital infrastructure—account for 
another 20 percent. Thus, infrastructure in a broad sense accounts on average for half of 
public investment in EU14. Public Goods and Redistribution account for about one-
quarter each. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the level and share of the different types of 
public investment. Public investment appears more volatile in level terms, suggesting that 
the cyclical ups and downs hit the various types of public investment relatively evenly, 
thus keeping their shares rather stable. In terms of trends, Infrastructure has been on an 
uptrend in levels and as a share of total owing mostly to the Cohesion countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), approaching 40 percent in recent years. The clearest 
downtrend is in Public Goods, which has declined from well over a quarter of total 
toward 20 percent.  
 
  7Figure 2: Evolution of public investment by type  
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
The evolution over time of the four types of public investment in different country groups 
is considered in Figure 3. “EU4” refers to the four large EU countries (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK); “EU6” refers to the six smaller old member states (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and “Coh” refers to the four Cohesion 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). Infrastructure investment has grown 
  8rapidly in the Cohesion countries while declining by almost one-half in EU4. Public 
investment in Hospitals and Schools has been relatively stable in EU4 and EU6, while 
declining in the Cohesion countries. Public Goods investment has been on a downtrend 
and Redistribution investment has moved in long cycles in EU4. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of public investment by type  
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
Turning then to the nexus between the composition of public investment and fiscal 
federalism, Figure 4 shows the shares of central and sub-national (regional and local) 
government in the four types of public investment introduced above. As regards 
Infrastructure, the central government accounts for almost all of public investment in 
Greece; roughly half in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands; and hardly any in 
Belgium. Regional and local governments account for the bulk of public investment in 
Hospitals and Schools, except in Greece, Portugal and the UK. The distribution between 
central and sub-national governments is fairly even as regards investment in Public 
  9Goods. Finally, sub-national levels of government account for over 80 percent of 
investment in Redistribution, except again in Greece. 
 
Figure 4. Public investment by type and level of government  
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Source:  Eurostat, own calculations. 
Note:  In cases where subnational and central government shares do not add up to 100 percent, the 
remainder is accounted for by budgetary funds (e.g., social security funds). 
 
 
Considering the evolution of fiscal federalism over time, Figure 5 suggests that the share 
of public investment by sub-national levels of government has been on a slight uptrend in 
the past decade and a half. This is especially clear for Hospitals and Schools, and also 
Public Goods. In contrast, the share of sub-national governments in Infrastructure and 
Redistribution investment has been more stable. 
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations.  
 
Let us now summarise some key stylised facts of the composition of public investment in 
Europe. First, the composition of public investment varies significantly between 
individual countries. On average, a third is traditional infrastructure investment, notably 
roads, and another 20 percent can be labelled human capital infrastructure, comprising 
hospitals and schools. These two types of public investment, accounting for half of total, 
are productive from an economic perspective, reducing firms’ costs and boosting human 
capital. The other half of public investment is roughly evenly split between public goods 
and redistribution, as defined in this section. 
 
The most striking trend development over the past decade and a half has been the 
increase in infrastructure investment in the Cohesion countries and its simultaneous 
downtrend in EU4.  
 
From the perspective of fiscal federalism, we noted as a general observation that the 
central government dominates public investment in public goods and, in a few countries, 
infrastructure. In contrast, regional and local governments account for the bulk of public 
investment in redistribution and, to a lesser extent, hospitals and schools. Investment by 
sub-national levels of government has tended to increase relative to total public 
investment during our sample period. Most notably, investment in hospitals and schools 
  11as well as in public goods have increasingly become the responsibility of sub-national 
levels of government.   
 
3.   Public Investment and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism 
 
Having reviewed the stylised facts of the composition of public investment and fiscal 
federalism in Europe, we now proceed to an overview of the “traditional” theory of fiscal 
federalism. The purpose of this section is to derive empirically testable hypotheses about 
the relationship between fiscal federalism and different types of public investment.  
 
However, a caveat is in order to start with. The theory of fiscal federalism—or any other 
theory for that matter—does not deal explicitly with the composition of public 
investment. At best, it distinguishes between consumption-oriented public expenditure 
and public expenditure to produce “public inputs” for the production processes of private 
firms. In what is to come we do not consider differences between current public spending 
and public investment per se; rather, we consider the various types of public investment 
as enhancements of production potential for different public services. Thus, infrastructure 
investment is considered to produce more future transportation services, and 
redistribution investment is considered to produce, e.g., more future recreation services. 
This perspective allows us to link the theory of fiscal federalism with the kind of data on 
the composition of public investment that we have.  
 
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism is based on the seminal contributions by 
Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), and Musgrave (1959). The underlying assumptions 
include, most importantly, the benevolence of the policy-maker in the centre (that is, his 
objective is the maximisation of social welfare); the existence of pure local public goods 
and global public goods (whose benefits accrue locally and nation-wide, respectively); 
benefit taxation (same incidence for the cost and benefit of public spending); factor 
mobility; and absence of spill-over effects of fiscal decisions horizontally (between 
regions) and vertically (between regions and the centre).  
 
  12Considering the responsiveness of public spending to local preferences and the creation 
of incentives for economic efficiency as policy goals, the theory derives normative 
conclusions about the optimal task assignment between the central and sub-national 
levels of government. Responsiveness to local preferences implies that decentralisation 
and fiscal competition are preferable in the provision of local public goods whenever 
local preferences are heterogeneous. On the other hand, centralisation is warranted in the 
provision of public goods whose optimal supply cannot be achieved by fiscal 
competition. Such goods include most notably global public goods, and it also includes 
the macroeconomic stabilisation and income redistribution functions of the government 
(which may be interpreted as providing global public goods as well). Public goods may 
also have spillover effects, with one region benefiting from a highway built by its 
neighbouring region, for example. Fiscal competition among sub-national levels of 
government will result in a sub-optimally low level of provision of such goods, as regions 
do not consider the spillover benefits in their individual decision-making. Oates (1972) 
suggests that the optimal provision can be achieved by means of matching grants from 
the centre, which act to internalise the externality.   
 
We have thus far identified three types of public goods (local, global, and spillover public 
goods) and the optimal level of government to provide each of them. We can now 
consider the different types of public investment in Table 1 against this background. 
Infrastructure, such as roads and other transportation infrastructure, provide both local 
benefits and positive spillover effects, in so far as it connects localities and regions. 
Hospitals and Schools provide also local benefits and positive spillover effects; the latter 
is especially the case when the labour force and population at large are mobile and move 
across regions. Public Goods, as defined in Table 1, is a mixture of local and global 
public goods, while Redistribution comprises chiefly local public goods.  
 
So how would one expect fiscal decentralisation to affect the different types of public 
investment? Investment in local public goods, most notably Redistribution, would 
unambiguously increase with decentralisation. Investment in Infrastructure as well as 
Hospitals and Schools would also increase with decentralisation, especially if 
  13supplemented with grants from the centre. Investment in Public Goods could go either 
way, depending on whether the aggregate Public Goods is more local or global in 
character. 
 
More recent literature on fiscal federalism has relaxed the assumption of no spillover 
effects in policy-making. Focussing on horizontal policy spillovers, consider regional tax 
competition.
3 With capital mobile across regions that seek to attract it, tax competition 
can lead to sub-optimally low tax rates (“race to the bottom”) and, as a consequence, 
insufficient provision of public services (both public consumption goods and 
“infrastructure”). The standard reference is Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986); however, 
Sinn (2003) has come out strongly against their analysis (see also Matsumoto, 1998). 
Hulten and Schwab (1997) discuss the circumstances where tax competition can lead to a 
sub-optimally low level of public capital. Competition between regions for an industry 
with external scale economies is a case in point: in competing for the location of such an 
industry, regions may reduce their tax rates so low as to unduly suppress public 
investment. 
 
Considering the impact of fiscal competition on the composition of public expenditure, 
Keen and Marchand (1997) argue that uncoordinated fiscal competition induces regions 
to over-invest in “local public inputs” at the cost of (consumption-oriented) local public 
goods. Investment in public inputs increases the potential of regions to attract mobile 
private capital, since public inputs reduce production costs for private firms. This 
generates distortions in the composition of public expenditure. Decentralisation leads to 
an over-supply of public inputs and an under-supply of local public goods.  
 
To sum up, fiscal competition has been argued to reduce public investment across the 
board (tax competition), but it has also been argued to boost productive public 
investment, at least relative to local public goods (broader fiscal competition). In terms of 
the public investment types in Table 1, these results would imply that decentralisation 
                                                 
3 We ignore here the literature of vertical fiscal externalities (see, e.g., Dahlby, 1996; Dahlby and Wilson, 
2003; Martinez-López, 2005). The predictions of that literature are ambiguous, hinging on assumptions 
whose relevance for our data sample we cannot assess.    
  14increase investment in Infrastructure as well as Hospitals and Schools, while reducing 
investment in Redistribution, at least in relative terms. This contrasts, notably, with the 
hypotheses above based on the older fiscal federalism literature.  
 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
 
To study the impact of fiscal federalism (fiscal decentralisation) on the four different 
types of public investment identified in Table 1, we conduct two complementary 
empirical analyses. First we study the impact of decentralisation on the level of each type 
of public investment. Second we study the impact of decentralisation on the share of each 
type of public investment in total public investment. Before presenting the methodologies 
and results of these analyses, we specify the model to be estimated and discuss the 
sample used in the estimations. 
 
4.1   Model Specification 
 
Although it is possible to formulate hypotheses of the relationship between 
decentralisation and the composition of public expenditure (investment) as in section 3, 
there is no explicit theoretical framework that could be used to derive a model of the 
determination of different types of public investment. We will therefore proceed directly 
to the specification of a reduced-form model to be estimated. In so doing we seek to 
identify exogenous variables measuring the impact of decentralisation on public 
investment, as well as a set of control variables that render the model empirically well-
specified. 
 
The reduced-form specification to be used in both levels and shares estimation is as 
follows: 
 
it it it it it
it it
u pop lend debt gdp
cap tax I
+   + +   + + + +
+ + =
− − − −
−
i t 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3
2 1 1 it c,
  year                
     
γ β β β β β
β β α
                (1) 
 
  15where uit ∼ i.i.d (0, σ
2), with subscript i referring to observations in the cross-section 
dimension (individual countries) and t to observations in the time dimension. The 
dependent variable Ic represents public investment of type c, c=1,…,4, as shown in Table 
1. In the levels analysis Ic is expressed relative to trend GDP,
4 
5 thus in theory assuming 
values in ℜ+. In the shares analysis it is expressed as a share of total public investment, 
assuming values in the interval (0, 1).  
 
Fiscal decentralisation is measured by two explanatory variables. First, our primary 
interest is in the share of tax revenue attributed to sub-national levels of government 
(regional and local governments), which is denoted tax.
6 Second, we control for 
investment grants from the central government to sub-national levels of government 
(cap); in the empirical analyses it is measured in relation to trend GDP.
 7 The tax share is 
lagged by one period to reflect the fact that investment decisions are most often taken a 
year before, based on knowledge about the revenue situation at that time. In contrast, 
capital transfers are contemporaneous with investment, as they finance investment the 
same year it is undertaken.
8  
 
Turning then to the control variables, they seek to capture the general economic, fiscal, 
and demographic developments of significance for the determination of public 
investment. Real GDP, denoted gdp in (1), is measured in per capita terms and lagged by 
one period to remove any simultaneity bias. The short- and longer term fiscal 
environment is captured by the budget surplus of the general government (lend) and 
public debt (debt). Both are measured in relation to trend GDP and lagged by one period, 
                                                 
4  Trend GDP is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with a smoothing parameter λ=100. 
5 Considering ratios to (trend) GDP improves the time series properties of the variables and facilitates the 
economic interpretation of the estimation results. 
6 Stegarescu (2004). We also considered other measures of decentralization, including total revenue share 
of sub-national levels of government, expenditure share of sub-national levels of government; and the ratio 
of sub-national tax revenue to expenditure. However, none of these alternative measures is conceptually 
superior to the tax share variable used; and all of them are empirically inferior, as they risk spurious 
correlation by including capital transfers (total revenue share) or the dependent variable (expenditure 
share), or by exhibiting non-stationarity (sub-national revenue-to expenditure ratio). 
7 The interaction term of tax and cap turned out to be insignificant in most of the estimations below and is 
therefore not reported. 
8 See Rodden (2003) for more details. 
  16for the reasons mentioned above. We also control for population density (pop).
9  γi 
denotes unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects that are included in the 
estimations (unless otherwise indicated). Finally, as explained below in greater detail, a 
linear time trend (year) is included, as some of the time series are trend stationary.  
 
4.2   Sample Data 
 
The main sample used in the estimations consists of a panel of EU10 countries (EU15 
less the Cohesion countries less Luxembourg) during the period 1990-2005. We exclude 
the Cohesion countries from our sample, because public investment in those countries has 
been significantly influenced by the receipt of EU support. As explained in section 2, not 
all countries have back-dated all relevant series to 1990, so the panel is unbalanced.  
 
The main data source is Eurostat’s New Cronos database. Data on the fiscal variables 
(budgetary surplus and public debt) as well as population come from the OECD. 
 
As regards the properties of our sample data, unit root tests indicate that our variables are 
either stationary or trend stationary (Annex 1, table A.1.1), thus warranting the inclusion 
of a time trend as another explanatory variable. We perform Levin, Lin, and Chu test 
(LLC, see Levin et al., 2002) as well as Im, Pesaran, and Chin test (IPS, see Im et al., 
1997) to verify the stationarity properties of our variables.  
 
The dependent variables are highly autocorrelated and persistent (Annex 1, Table A.1.2), 
with first-order autocorrelation coefficients between 0.8 and 0.9 for all types of public 
investment, in both levels and shares. 
 
Correlation among our explanatory variables is mostly negligible (Annex 1, Table A.1.3). 
Only correlation coefficients between the tax share variable and GDP per capita and 
population density are rather high at 0.65 and -0.44, respectively.  
                                                 
9 As a robustness check we also considered unemployment, birth rates, migration rates, and mortality rates 
as additional control variables. They turned out to be mostly insignificant and did not change the estimation 
results materially. 
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4.3   Analysis in Levels 
4.3.1   Estimation Methodology
10 
 
As our dependent variables are highly autocorrelated (Annex 1, Table A.1.2.), we choose 
a dynamic specification of the model (1) for the levels analysis, including the lagged 
dependent variable as another explanatory variable. The dynamic model specification 
thus becomes:  
 
   
it i it it it it
it it it c
u pop lend debt gdp
cap tax I I
+ +   +   + + + +
+ + + =
− − − −
− −
γ β β β β β
β β β α
  year                
     
t 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3
2 1 1 1 , 1 it c,                  (2) 
 
The estimation of specification (2) will have to account for the correlation between the 
regressors (lagged dependent) and the composite term (γi  + uit), which renders least 
squares estimators inconsistent even asymptotically. To circumvent this problem we 
employ General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, which has become the 
workhorse in estimating dynamic panel data models.
11 
 
To test the robustness of the results, we compare several GMM and least squares -based 
estimation methods. We use various GMM estimation procedures (1-step and 2-step 
difference-GMM as well as system-GMM). In addition, we present the results of the 
following least squares –based estimations: (1) as a “benchmark”, fixed effects OLS (FE 
OLS) with the lagged dependent variable, which we know to be inconsistent; (2) fixed 
effects two-stage least squares (FE 2SLS) estimation of the first-differenced regression 
equation (2) with the second lag of the dependent variable as an instrument. If now the 
error term is serially uncorrelated and the initial conditions Ic,i1 predetermined (i.e., 
uncorrelated with subsequent error terms), the FE 2SLS estimators are consistent for 
panels with large N and fixed T dimensions. However, with further lags of the dependent 
                                                 
10 All estimations are conducted using eViews 5.1 or Stata 8.e or 9. 
11 Arellano and Bond (1991) and Bond (2002). 
  18as additional instruments, the FE 2SLS estimators are not asymptotically efficient, while 
GMM estimators are. 
 
In sum, we use the Sargan and residual autocorrelation tests to select the preferred GMM-
based estimation method. We then compare the results obtained with FE OLS estimation 
and FE 2SLS estimation, which we know are inconsistent, by way of robustness 
checking.  
4.3.2   Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the preferred estimation method, which is one-step 
difference-GMM. All other results are shown in Annex 2, which also contains the results 
of the estimation of (1) with the aggregate public investment as the dependent variable. 
 
One-step difference-GMM estimation is alone in passing the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions and residual autocorrelation tests (labelled m1 for first-order 
and m2 for second-order autocorrelation) for all four estimated models in levels. Two-
step difference-GMM estimation is associated with the absence of first-degree residual 
autocorrelation throughout. The difference-Sargan test for system-GMM estimation, in 
turn, rejects the validity of the additional differenced instruments for two out of four 
estimated models.  
 
As shown in Annex 2, the residuals from the least squares –based estimations are not 
always well-behaved. The FE OLS estimation suffers from residual non-normality, as 
indicated by the p-value of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistic. The FE 2SLS, on the other 
hand, is in many cases associated with a relatively low value of the Durbin-Watson test 





  19Table 2: 1-step GMM estimation results  
(Dependent variable type of investment relative to trend GDP). 


























































(p-values)  0.2616 0.9668 0.2302 0.7263
m1 (p-value)  0.0371 0.0648 0.0262 0.0393
m2 (p-value)  0.2852 0.4936 0.1440 0.9124
Nobs.  104 104 102 101
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Coefficient estimates for the constant and linear time trend 
are omitted. Significance at 10% level indicated in bold. t-values in parentheses. 
 
Considering the results in Table 2, we conclude that a higher sub-national tax share 
increases the aggregate level of investment in Infrastructure, Hospitals and Schools, and 
Public Goods, but it has no statistically significant impact on the aggregate public 
investment in Redistribution. The parameter estimates imply that an increase in the sub-
national tax share by one percentage point leads to an increase in investment in 
Infrastructure and Public Goods of about 0.02 percentage points of GDP, or 2.2 and 2.8 
percent, respectively, evaluated at sample mean. The parameter estimate for Hospitals 
and Schools implies that a one percentage point increase in the sub-national tax share 
leads to an average increase of 1.8 percent in investment.  
 
Comparing the 1-step GMM estimates with the alternatives in Annex 2, we observe that 
the sign and significance of the least squares –based estimates are the same as in Table 2, 
but the magnitudes of the least squares –estimates tend to be slightly smaller.  
 
  20Returning to Table 2 and considering the coefficient estimates for capital transfers, we 
observe a significant positive impact on investment in Hospitals and Schools as well as 
Public Goods. An increase of capital transfers by 1 percent of GDP boosts these types of 
investment by 0.07 and 0.09 percentage points of GDP (14 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively, at sample mean). The FE OLS results are remarkably similar in terms of 
significance, sign and magnitude, and while the magnitude of the FE 2SLS estimates is 
also equally close to the 1-step GMM estimates, there are discrepancies in terms of 
significance. 
 
As regards other control variables, real per capita GDP is significant and positive in all 
four models, with a coefficient estimate of 0.3-0.5 in the 1-step GMM estimations and 
0.2-0.3 in the least squares –based estimations; however, two of the FE 2SLS estimates 
are again insignificant. The fiscal variables are mostly insignificant, except that higher 
budgetary surpluses reduce investment in Redistribution and that higher public debt goes 
hand in hand with higher investment in Public Goods. This latter result is confirmed in 
the least squares –estimations, with the coefficient estimate virtually the same across all 
methods. However, the coefficient estimates for the fiscal variables in the other models 
are less similar in terms of even significance and signs. Finally, population density turns 
out to be significant for all types of investment except for Infrastructure. This pattern also 
appears in the least squares estimations. 
 
  
4.4   Analysis in Shares 
4.4.1   Estimation Methodology 
 
The econometric analysis of the determinants of shares of the different types of public 
investment has to tackle some additional challenges. The dependent variable is now 
fractional, limited to the interval (0, 1) with no observations at the endpoints. These 
features necessitate the employment of a non-linear estimation method while, at the same 
time, excluding the use of some recent innovations, such as the tobit specification for 
dynamic panel data with endpoint observations proposed by Loudermilk (2005). 
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Again, we employ a number of alternative estimation methods for comparison. The focus 
will be on Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE), based on Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996 and 2005). This approach has been labelled fractional logit, or “flogit” 
for short—a label we adopt below. 
 
In the presence of panel fixed effects, flogit estimation may suffer from inconsistency due 
to the so-called incidental parameter problem.
12 To address the problem, Papke and 
Wooldridge (2005) propose the use of pooled QMLE. The pooled QMLE is based on 
accounting for the fixed effects without including dummies to that end. Instead, the 
average value of each explanatory variable (average over time) is added as additional 
explanatory variable, so the coefficient estimate for each initial explanatory variable 
measures the impact of the deviation from the average. Cross-section fixed effects are 
now captured by the averages, and inconsistently estimated fixed effects are removed as a 
source of inconsistency in other parameter estimates.   
 
The model to be estimated in pooled QMLE is thus: 
 
c,it 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
ii 7t8 9 1 0 i 1 1 1 2 1 3 ii
        
           year          
it it it it it it
i it
I tax cap gdp debt lend pop
tax cap gdp debt lend pop u
α βββ β β β
ββ β β β ββ
−− − − − =+ + + + + +  +
++ + + + + +   +      
                                                
            (3) 
 
where bars above variables denotes averages over time.  
 
Given the relatively small number of observations in our panel, the increase in the 
number of parameters to be estimated from (1) to (3)—together with the low variance of 
our dependent variable—can, however, take a crucial toll on efficiency and significance. 
Besides, it is not clear whether and to what extent this incidental parameter problem and 
the resulting inconsistency are problems in our case to start with. Our panel has more 
observations in the T dimension (up to 16) than in the N dimension; hence, the problem is 
less obvious than in typical micro-data panels with just a few observations in time. For 
 
12 See Greene (2003) or Lancaster (2000) for more details. 
  22these reasons, we consider the results of pooled QMLE just as a robustness check for the 
flogit results. 
 
Yet further estimation methods employed as robustness checks include OLS with fixed 
effects; 2SLS; and one-step GMM. These methods do not account for the fractional 
character of our dependent variable, and may therefore result in loss in terms of 
efficiency and significance (Papke and Wooldridge, 2005). When considering the results 
from these supplementary estimations we focus therefore more on the signs of the 
coefficient estimates than on their significance and magnitude. 
4.4.2   Results 
 
Table 4 shows the flogit results. Results obtained with the other estimation methods are 
reported in Annex 3. Note that we do not include the lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable in the QMLEs. In principle this could well be done; however, due to 
the high degree of persistence in our dependent variables, the inclusion of the lagged 




The numerical parameter estimates shown for the flogit and pooled QMLE should, 
notably, be interpreted as marginal effects at sample mean. Non-linearities can in general 
cause a difference between marginal effects at sample mean and Average Partial Effects 
(APE); however, given that our observations on the dependent variable are located in the 
interior of the interval (0, 1), with no observations at the endpoints, the estimates shown 
should not be very different from the APE. 
 
 
Table 3: Flogit estimation results  
                                                 
13 As Arze del Granado et al. (2005) and Wagner (2003), we employ White’s (1982) robust “sandwich” 
estimator to improve the consistency of our variance-covariance matrix. Greene (2003) points out that the 
sandwich estimator provides in most cases an appropriate asymptotic covariance matrix for an estimator 
that is biased in an unknown direction due to omitted variables, autocorrelation, or heteroskedasticity. 
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Nobs. 122 122 120 122 
Note: White robust standard errors. t-values in parentheses. Significance at 10% level indicated in bold. 
Coefficient estimates for linear time trend and constant are omitted. 
 
Decentralisation increases the share of public investment in Hospitals and Schools and 
decreases the share of Redistribution. If the sub-national tax share increases by one 
percentage point, the share of investment in Hospitals and Schools increases by 0.45 
percentage points, while it decreases by 0.32 percentage points for Redistribution. The 
level of decentralisation does not affect the share of investment in Infrastructure or Public 
Goods. As expected, the results of pooled QMLE estimation are insignificant, but the 
signs coincide with the above, except for Public Goods. The results of the 1-step GMM 
estimation are similar, except that the sign (and significance) of the coefficient estimate 
for Public Goods is now as in flogit. The FE OLS estimation reproduces the signs and 
significance of the flogit estimation. 2SLS yields the same signs as flogit, but the 
significance differs. 
 
Turning to the impact of capital transfers, the flogit results suggest that an increase in 
them is associated with an increase in the relative share of Public Goods and a decrease in 
that of Infrastructure. A one percent increase of capital transfers in terms of GDP leads to 
an increase in Public Goods by 4.8 percentage points and a decrease in the share 
investment in Infrastructure by 6.3 percentage points. Again, pooled QMLE returns the 
same signs and significance as flogit, except now for Redistribution (different sign). The 
  241-step GMM estimates yields consistently the same signs. The least squares –based 
methods give more mixed results. 
 
As regards other control variables, the logit estimation results suggest that GDP growth 
comes with relatively more investment in Hospitals and Schools and Redistribution but 
less in Infrastructure. A worsening budgetary situation reduces the relative share of 
investment in Hospitals and Schools and Public Goods, while increasing the share of 
Infrastructure and Redistribution. Finally, increasing public debt reduces the share of 
Infrastructure investment, but benefits Hospitals and Schools. 
 
Put differently, investment in Infrastructure on the one hand and Hospitals and Schools 
on the other hand appear to crowd out one another. Whenever the cyclical situation 
improves, there is more investment in Hospitals and Schools, at the cost of Infrastructure. 
The same situation arises when public debt increases.  
 
Finally, the share of Infrastructure investment decreases with population density, while 
the share of investment in Hospitals and Schools increases. This pattern is confirmed by 
most other estimation methods reported in Annex 3. 
 
5.   Economic Interpretation of Results 
 
We saw in section 3 how the traditional theory of fiscal federalism could be used to 
derive some hypotheses about the composition of public investment. Most notably, it 
suggests that a higher degree of fiscal decentralisation should result in more public 
investment in spillover goods, such as Infrastructure as well as Hospital and Schools, 
especially if accompanied by capital transfers from the centre to internalise the spillover 
effects of such investments. Furthermore, more decentralisation should result in more 
investment in Redistribution (local public goods)—a result challenged by the more recent 
theory of fiscal competition. Finally, the impact of decentralisation on our variable Public 
Goods was considered ambiguous, depending on whether it is dominated by local or 
global public goods.  
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The key results of the empirical analysis of section 4 are summarised in Table 4. It shows 
the signs of the estimated coefficients in both levels and shares analyses. This section 
seeks to interpret these results from the perspective of the theory of fiscal federalism.   
 
Table 4: Signs of estimated coefficients for the tax share variable 
 1.INF  2.HS  3.PG  4.RED 
Level  +  + + 0 
Share 0  +  0  - 
 
 
As shown in Table 4, decentralisation in terms of tax shares increases public investment 
in Infrastructure; Hospitals and Schools; and Public Goods, with investment in Hospitals 
and Schools increasing more than the others. The “excess” increase in Hospital and 
School investment comes at the expense of Redistribution investment, whose relative 
share (but not level) drops with decentralisation.  
 
In other words, the estimated impact of full decentralisation on the composition of public 
investment can be interpreted in terms of fiscal competition, (Keen and Marchand, 1997). 
Decentralisation increases the level of investment in especially Infrastructure as well as 
Hospitals and Schools, both providing “public inputs”. What is more, the increase in 
investment in Hospitals and Schools suppresses the share of investment in Redistribution 
(local public consumption-oriented goods). It is noteworthy that decentralisation does not 
lower the level of any type of public investment. This being the case, we do not see any 
evidence of decentralisation being associated with tax competition that would have a 
detrimental impact on public investment. 
 
The result that full decentralisation reduces the share of Redistribution investment is, 
however, more difficult to reconcile with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism. Our 
Redistribution variable is meant to capture consumption-oriented local public goods, such 
  26as recreational facilities, and full decentralisation should lead to an increase, not relative 
decline, in their provision.  
 
As suggested above, fiscal competition may play a role by biasing sub-national 
governments’ spending in favour of public inputs, at the expense of consumption-
oriented local public goods. However, the relative decline in Redistribution investment 
can be given another interpretation as well. That its share actually declines with 
decentralisation can signal over-investment in Redistribution in centralised systems 
(Rattsø, 2003). With lower level governments competing for a “common pool” of 
resources, there may be strategic reasons for them to misrepresent the local (or regional) 
demand for public services captured in Redistribution. This being the case, 
decentralisation would reduce such strategic behaviour and bring Redistribution in line 
with local demand.  
 
In sum, our results suggest that decentralisation increases economically productive public 
investment, notably investment in public spillover goods (Infrastructure; Hospitals and 
Schools) and in local and global public goods. There is no statistically significant impact 
of decentralisation on public investment in consumption-oriented local public goods 
(Redistribution). Decentralisation changes the composition of public investment by 
boosting the relative share of Hospitals and Schools, at the expense of the share of 
Redistribution.  
 
While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, especially 
as regards the provision of local public goods, these findings can be interpreted in terms 
of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the quality of public 
expenditure weighing in firms’ location decisions. The finding that decentralisation 
reduces the relative share of Redistribution investment can also signal over-investment in 




  276.   Conclusion 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the presentation of the stylised facts of the 
composition of public investment in Europe is a novelty. Especially the insight that less 
than half of all public investment supports “infrastructure” in some sense of the word is 
noteworthy, given that it is customary in both theoretical and empirical literature to use 
“public investment” and “infrastructure investment” almost synonymously.  
 
Second, the empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the 
composition of public investment is also first–of–a–kind, at least in the European context. 
It yields some interesting insights, most notably that fiscal decentralisation seems to boost 
economically productive public investment and to curb the relative share of economically 
less productive public investment.   
 
Clearly, this is but a first step in the analysis of the composition of public investment. 
There is plenty of scope for future research to tackle issues that our analysis leaves open. 
The theoretical foundations for studying the composition of public investment remain 
thin, especially as regards the articulation of an explicit link between fiscal federalism 
and different types of investment. Empirical examination of different types of public 
investment could usefully focus on differences in their productivity, as well as on a more 
nuanced examination of what drives the different types of investment, including but not 
limited to fiscal federalism.  
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Table A1.1:  Unit root test results. 
  Effect Test Statistic P-value   Effect Test  Statistic P-value   
LLC -2.8633 0.002*** LLC  -0.6358 0.263      1.INF (level)  ft 
IPS 0.0706 0.528   
f 
IPS 0.16646 0.566     
LLC -4.472 0.000*** LLC  -4.66191 0  *** 
2.HS (level)  ft  IPS -0.8755 0.191    f  IPS -2.11709 0.017  ** 
LLC -3.7699 0.000*** LLC -3.68242 0.000  *** 
3.PG (level)  ft  IPS 0.0221 0.509    f  IPS -2.28425 0.011  ** 
LLC -1.6212 0.053*  LLC -3.16266 0.001  *** 
4.RED (level)  ft  IPS -0.5546 0.290    f  IPS -1.0984 0.136     
LLC -6.597 0.000*** LLC  -5.52724 0.000  *** 
1.INF (share)  ft  IPS -1.6525 0.049*  f  IPS -2.57763 0.005  *** 
LLC -5.8594 0.000*** LLC -5.06737 0.000  *** 
2.HS (share)  ft  IPS -2.4246 0.007*** f  IPS -2.27868 0.011  ** 
LLC -6.4601 0.000*** LLC -2.78727 0.003  *** 
3.PG (share)  ft  IPS -1.9233 0.027**  f  IPS -1.83078 0.034  ** 
LLC -5.7944 0.000*** LLC -2.73485 0.003  ***  4.RED 
(share)  ft  IPS -1.3125 0.095*  f  IPS -1.19257 0.117   
LLC -2.0155 0.022*  LLC -3.98932 0.000  *** 
Lend  ft  IPS -1.2798 0.100  f  IPS -1.04089 0.149   
LLC -10.593 0.000*** LLC -0.70526 0.240     
Debt  ft  IPS -2.6409 0.004*** f  IPS 0.58686 0.721   
LLC -6.4297 0.000*** LLC -2.80209 0.003  *** 
Cap  ft  IPS -2.6135 0.005*** f  IPS -1.94034 0.026  ** 
LLC -8.8095 0.000*** LLC  2.14455 0.984     
Gdp  ft  IPS -4.586 0.000*** f  IPS 5.18343 1   
LLC -2.2478 0.012**  LLC -0.39658 0.346     
Otaxshl  ft  IPS -1.8406 0.033**  f  IPS -0.03522 0.486   
LLC  4.96377 0.000*** LLC   0.42430  0.664 
Pop  ft 
IPS 3.25404 0.001***
f 
IPS   4.39171  1.000  
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. f denotes fixed and 
individual effects, t denotes time trend. 
 
Table A1.2: Autocorrelation in the dependent variables. 
  AC Q-Stat  Prob    AC Q-Stat  Prob 
1.INF (level)  0.886 107.56  0.000 1.INF (share)  0.889 107.50  0.000 
2.HS (level)  0.844 97.511  0.000 2.HS (share)  0.901 110.44  0.000 
3.PG (level)  0.810 88.663  0.000 3.PG (share)  0.767 78.876  0.000 
4.RED (level)  0.854 99.156  0.000 4.RED (share)  0.870 102.85  0.000 
 
Table A1.3. Correlation matrix for explanatory varibales. 
 tax  cap  gdp  lend    debt pop 
tax  1  
cap  -0.1664 1  
gdp  0.6460 -0.1708 1  
lend  -0.1163 0.0847 0.2037 1  
debt  0.0762 0.0305 -0.2045 -0.1421 1  
pop  -0.4374 0.1374 -0.3317 0.1210 0.1928 1 
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Table A2.1: Results in levels, investment in Infrastructure to trend GDP 
1.INV (level)   OLS FE  FE 2SLS

























































R²-Adj  0.952903 0.935001  
Sargan  1.0000 0.390
2 
m1  0.2577
  0.035 
m2  0.4951 0.183 
DW  1.614391 1.595305  
JB (p-value)  0.002023 0.523460  
Nobs.  117 108 104 118 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. 
1 Dependent variable lagged by 2 periods used as an instrument, GLS cross section weights used.  
2 Difference-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for additional instruments. 
 
  33Table A2.2: Results in levels, investment in Hospitals and Schools to trend GDP 
2.HS (level)  OLS FE   FE 2SLS

























































R²-Adj  0.928727 0.920366  
Sargan  
(p-value)  1.0000 0.001
2 
m1 (p-value)  0.6001 0.095  
m2 (p-value)  0.2071 0.232 
DW  2.024791 1.226088  
JB (p-value)  0.000000 0.398266  
Nobs.  117 108 104 118 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold.
 
1 Dependent variable lagged by 2 periods used as an instrument, GLS cross section weights used.  
2 Difference-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for additional instruments. 
  34Table A2.3: Results in levels, investment in Public Goods to trend GDP 
3.PG (level)  OLS FE  FE 2SLS

























































R²-Adj  0.854071 0.918955  
Sargan  
(p-value)  1.0000 0.919
2 
m1 (p-value)  0.5656 0.012 
m2 (p-value)  0.0051 0.120 
DW  1.770431 1.714054  
JB (p-value)  0.033218 0.385152  
Nobs.  115 106 102 116 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. 
1 Dependent variable lagged by 2 periods used as an instrument, GLS cross section weights used.  
2 Difference-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for additional instruments.  
 
  35Table A2.4: Results in levels, investment in Redistribution to trend GDP 
4.RED (level)   OLS FE  FE 2SLS

























































R²-Adj  0.947644 0.948249  
Sargan 
(p-value)  1.0000 0.001
2 
m1 (p-value)  0.1800 0.048 
m2 (p-value)  0.7329 0.984 
DW  1.914130 1.677006  
JB (p-value)  0.168701 0.878456  
Nobs.  115 105 101 116 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. 
1 Dependent variable lagged by 2 periods used as an instrument, GLS cross section weights used.  
2 Difference-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for additional instruments.  
 
  36Table A2.5: Results in levels, total public investment to trend GDP 
 
 












































(p-values)  0.6066 1.0000 
m1 (p-values)  0.0617 0.7113 
m2 (p-values)  0.3229 0.3886 



















Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. The OLS FE estimation 
done using STATA, not Eviews, as in Tables A2.1-4. 
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R²-Adj  0.956315 0.989788  
m1 (p-value)  0.0228  
m2 (p-value)  0.3369  
DW  1.136066 2.530871  
JB (p-value)  0.411646 0.814093  
Nobs.  122 105 101 122 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. Coefficient estimates for 
linear time trend and constant are omitted.  
 




























































R²-Adj  0.976523 0.972218  
m1 (p-value)  0.0691  
m2 (p-value)  0.7567  
DW  1.239018 1.482795  
JB (p-value)  0.787488 0.063246  
Nobs.  122 105 101 122 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. Coefficient estimates for 
linear time trend and constant are omitted.  
 




























































R²-Adj  0.970105 0.929561  
m1 (p-value)  0.1073  
m2 (p-value)  0.2851  
DW  1.070753 2.103505  
JB (p-value)  0.784856 0.328593  
Nobs.  120 103 99 120 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. Coefficient estimates for 
linear time trend and constant are omitted.  
 
 


























































R²-Adj  0.925187 0.972364  
m1 (p-value)  0.0110  
m2 (p-value)  0.2407  
DW  1.098886 1.788161  
JB (p-value)  0.589221 0.689423  
Nobs.  122 105 101 122 
Note: t-values in parentheses; significance at 10 percent level indicated in bold. Coefficient estimates for 
linear time trend and constant are omitted.  
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